and since the first edition of this book the aetiological role of Campylobacter infection and the therapeutic benefit of intravenous immunoglobulin treatment have been elucidated. Conditions which may mimic Guillain-Barre syndrome are discussed in later chapters and include toxic neuropathy (e.g. due to glue-sniffing or heavy metal poisoning), Lyme neuropathy, and even rabies. At the end of many chapters there are some case reports. One child developed fatal paralytic rabies more than 5 years after a forgotten animal bite overseas.
Some things in the book are unclear (how old is the 'teenager who had sniffed glue since he was 13'?), unconvincing (figure 11.11 does not really demonstrate that vincristine-induced neuropathy eventually resolves), or waffle ('vitamin B6 complex' is not complex; it is pyridoxine).
As a non-specialist, I would have liked a problem-based approach rather than diagnosis-based one, and more about the incidence of the various conditions. Nevertheless, this is an authoritative and well-presented book, and I know that our local paediatric neurologist has already snapped up a copy. In a previous RCGP monograph, Peter Toon identified three broad theoretical perspectives operating within general practice-biomechanical, which takes a utilitarian, individual, mechanistic approach to illness and treatment; anticipatory, which extends this to include preventive and group approaches to health; and interpretative, which concentrates on beliefs, understanding and meaning. His two principal aims in writing his new paper are to reconcile these perspectives and to locate them within a system of values based on virtue ethics. Toon begins this ambitious task by reformulating his previous discussion on the relationship between fact and values. He considers that human beings have a need for meaning, and that we tend to use the limited information available to us to construct views of the world that are essentially probabilistic and uncertain. However, he does not accept a completely relativistic position, arguing that any theories and value systems must ultimately be constrained by tests against external reality.
He gets to grips with his first aim-of reconciling the three models of general practice-by reviewing the various biomechanical and humanist models of human beings, or selfhood. He stresses the importance of the humanist concepts of autonomy and narrative, but suggests that we should 'sit lightly' on our models: humans are both objects and subjects, and these differing perspectives may act as useful counterweights for each other. He takes 'action failure' as the most useful concept in understanding the meaning of illness.
He then brings together three related constructs: biomechanical (including anticipatory) v. interpretative; hedonic v. teleological; and health v. autonomy. Biomechanical approaches tend to promote health, whereas interpretative ones focus on autonomy; interpretative approaches focus on outcome in terms of meaning, whereas biomechanical ones tend to emphasize the reduction of pain and the enhancement of pleasure. Although he does not attempt a full theoretical synthesis of these models, Toon enables us to form judgments about their relative merits in particular clinical situations and equips us with a set of tools with which to evaluate the purpose of our medical activities.
In the second half, Toon explores the title concept of the virtuous practitioner. The concept of virtue is taken to mean, inter alia, having the qualities needed to act rightly in face of the challenges of life. He considers that it can only be properly understood in particular contexts, and uses Maclntyre's theory of virtue (Maclntyre A, After Virtue a Study in Moral Theory, London: Duckworth, 1985) as a basis for developing his argument. Maclntyre's key concepts include: 'practices' which are defined as complex, coherent and cooperative activities with inherent standards of excellence; 'internal goods', which refer to the intrinsic rewards, such as satisfaction and pleasure, resulting from achieving those standards of excellence; and 'external goods', which are what the practice is designed to produce. Practices may be selfcontained, such as chess, music or sport; or may be purposive, such as architecture.
Toon suggests that general practice should be seen as a specific practice within medicine, and that we must recognize the internal goods of general practice, such as being a healer, as an important motivating force. In order to construct a typology of virtues for general practice, he employs the traditional Christian system of four cardinal virtues (courage, prudence, temperance and justice) and three theological virtues (faith, hope and charity) and describes how they may be applied to general practice. In the final two chapters, he applies various theories of justice to general practice, discusses the gatekeeper v. advocacy dilemma, and then proposes ways in which we can cultivate virtue in training and clinical practice. Toon covers an enormous number of topics in 64 pages of text. His paper should lead to informed critical debate both within and outside general practice. However, at times it becomes something of a whistlestop tour through contemporary philosophical and psychological theories. He might have been better advised to address each of his principal aims separately, and at greater length.
I take issue with Toon on two important points. Turning Maclntyre's concepts back onto his own argument, it seems to me that, by failing to synthesize his different models of general practice, he is by definition unable to describe it as a 'practice' in Maclntyre's sense. Secondly, I was not convinced by his description of the 'internal goods' for general practice. His decision to call on an external set of theologically derived criteria for assessing virtue, which he claims was taken 'in the absence of any better system', is perhaps a telling indication of the difficulties inherent in achieving an adequate conceptual understanding of the virtuous practitioner. From my own, somewhat existentialist position (Dowrick C, Frith L, General Practice and Ethics: Uncertainty and Responsibility, London: Routledge, 1999), the pursuit of unified models of practice and virtue is like the search for the Holy Grail-worthwhile for the intellectual and moral rigour it demands, but Charles Darwin, John Bunyan and Florence Nightingale are amongst the figures from history who are believed to have suffered from obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). According to the 1998 British Psychiatric Morbidity Survey, one in every hundred adults meets the full diagnostic criteria for this debilitating condition. Unlike mere superstition, worry and doubt, obsessions are recurrent intrusive thoughts or impulses that are unsuccessfully resisted (such as a fear of contamination from germs or of harming loved ones). Compulsions represent the associated rituals (hand washing, checking, cleaning or mental arguments) that bring only temporary relief-rather like scratching an itchy rash.
OCD impairs quality of life: sufferers are less likely to marry, and have worse social functioning both at work and in leisure activities, than those with diabetes. The disorder often first appears in young adulthood and for over 80% runs a fluctuating but chronic and unremitting course if left untreated. Fortunately, modern intervention, with cognitive behaviour therapy used together with clomipramine or serotonin-specific reuptake inhibitors, can achieve substantial benefits in 50-80% of patients.
We now believe that OCD involves serotonin dysfunction in a neuronal loop between the orbital frontal cortex, cingulate gyrus and the basal ganglia: indeed selective neurosurgical ablation can work for intractable cases. Fascinating recent research indicates that, in the above areas of the brain, regional blood flow and neuronal metabolism are depressed during use of the behavioural treatment known as exposure and response prevention (e.g. regularly touching contaminated objects but not washing afterwards). So it appears that talking-treatments really can change brain function. This book aims to provide practical advice regarding management, based on the evidence from randomized controlled trials, current clinical consensus and the author's personal experience as director of a specialist clinic at Stanford University, California. Its strengths include a clear, well-referenced writing style, with drug management and side-effects well covered. I found the summary tables at the end of each chapter a useful guide to planning treatment. The appendices contain rating scales and internet website addresses for self-help materials and patient interest groups around the world. Professor Koran takes a broad view of the spectrum of obsessive-compulsive disorders, including hypochondriasis, Gilles de la Tourette syndrome, pathological jealousy, gambling, kleptomania, hair pulling and even skin picking.
There is a noticeable bias in this book towards drug treatments, and the perspective of the United States in particular. I suspect that British clinicians would be reluctant to treat the deleterious effects of fluoxetine on sexual function by adding another antidepressant or dexamphetamine. Similarly, I hope we have not reached the stage on this side of the Atlantic where a decision to prescribe psychotropic drugs during pregnancy can be made only after the patient has signed a 'letter drafted by a knowledgeable attorney accepting full responsibility'.
Use of psychological treatments as a first-line intervention will help to prevent the relapse that can occur in over half of sufferers when antidepressant drugs are stopped. Little space is offered to modern cognitive therapy, which may be as effective as behavioural exposure techniques. Research studies have shown that over 90% of the general population experience intrusive and upsetting thoughts-such as 'what if I jumped out in front of the traffic?' whilst waiting to cross a busy road, or 'what if I shouted out obscenities?' when sitting in a church. However, those with OCD seem unable to stand back and see these ideas as 'just thoughts'. They accept personal and excessive responsibility, grossly overestimate the likelihood of something serious actually
